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1 Introduction
The (provocative) title refers to prospective payment and cost reimbursement, the most
common mechanisms for paying health care providers. In prospective payment, a health
care provider receives a xed price for delivering a course of medical services, irrespective
of the resources that have been used. In cost reimbursement, a provider receives a measure
of costs corresponding to the resources for the delivery of medical services.1 These two
payment methods have been studied extensively and intensively over the past thirty years.
The conventional wisdom is that prospective payment and cost reimbursement give rise to
di¤erent quality and cost-e¢ciency incentives. In this paper, we describe a model in which
prospective payment and cost reimbursement can give rise to identical quality and cost
incentives. This model actually di¤ers from the conventional one only in how consumers
learn about quality.
The canonical model for studying quality and cost e¢ciency is this. A health care provider
chooses quality and cost-reduction e¤orts. These e¤orts are non-contractible. The provider
incurs private disutilities by expending these e¤orts. The cost of providing services consists
of a marginal cost as well as the e¤ort disutilities. A higher quality requires a higher marginal
cost and attracts more consumers, but a higher cost e¤ort reduces the marginal cost. An
insurer wants to implement socially e¢cient quality and cost e¤orts.
Under prospective payment, the provider internalizes the production cost, so its cost-
reduction incentive is aligned with the insurers. What about the providers quality incentive?
Seeking to maximize prot, the provider considers raising quality to attract more consumers.
The marginal benet of this depends on the prospective payment level, and this has to
be traded o¤ against the quality e¤ort marginal disutility. By choosing the appropriate
prospective payment level, the insurer aligns the providers prot motive to one consistent
with the implementation of the socially e¢cient quality. Prospective payment can kill two
birds with one stone.
Cost reimbursement works in a perverse way. Because all marginal costs will be reim-
bursed, the provider lacks any incentive to use cost e¤ort. Cost reimbursement results in
cost ine¢ciency. The quality incentive can still be implemented by paying the provider a
margin above cost for services rendered. Again, the provider raises quality to attract more
consumers because of the protable margin.
In the two payment systems, the common principle motivating quality is demand re-
sponse: higher quality raises demand. In each system, a prot margin incentivizes the
provider to expend quality e¤ort. The di¤erence is that the provider internalizes costs under
prospective payment, but does not do so under cost reimbursement.
1For our purpose, cost reimbursement is the same as fee-for-service: a provider chooses medical
services to supply, and receives a fee for each chosen service. This fee reects the cost of the service
and allows a prot margin. There are variations in prospective payment; it may be supplemented
by outlier compensations, local-market adjustments, etc. These variations are unimportant for this
paper.
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The notion of a demand response requires consumers to know about quality. This is a
common assumption in the literature (see more discussion below). Naturally, if consumers
could never be conveyed service quality information, the health care market would collapse
completely. Given that the health market is very active in all economies, some quality
information must be available to consumers. Most health economists, however, would agree
that health care quality information can be di¢cult to obtain and interpret. Indeed, insurers,
governments, and sponsors increasingly have helped consumers nd out about quality. For
a summary of empirical works on public reporting initiatives, see Dranove and Jin (2011).
In this paper, we make an alternative assumption about information structures in the
canonical model. Here, we assume that consumers cannot observe quality directly, but the
insurer can. Furthermore, although cost e¤ort is noncontractible, the insurer can also observe
it. The insurer can credibly disclose information about quality and cost e¤orts to consumers.
The canonical model obtains if the insurer simply discloses any quality e¤ort chosen by the
provider. (Consumers are insured and uninterested in cost e¤ort anyway.) In fact, if a
prospective payment system is used, the insurer simply fully discloses quality information,
and implements the rst-best quality and cost e¤orts.
The surprise is that the insurer can use cost reimbursement to implement the rst best by
disclosing partial information about quality and cost. Our innovation is that by disclosing
a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost e¤orts, the insurer incentivizes the
provider to undertake cost e¤ort, even when all costs are reimbursed. The key is that
demand depends on consumers perception about quality from the value index. The insurer
insists on mixing quality and cost-e¤ort information in the quality index. The incentive for
cost e¤ort comes from the provider achieving a value index by prot-maximizing quality and
cost e¤ort. Indeed, cost reimbursement and strategic information disclosure implement the
same allocation as prospective payment. Before we explain this result, we should point out
its relevance.
Prospective payment has various unintended consequences. First, because the price is
xed, the provider takes a loss when treating high-cost consumers. Second, for the same
reason, the provider earns more prot by attracting low-cost consumers. Dumping and
cream-skimming under prospective payment have been studied extensively in the literature.
Third, prospective payment encourages fraudulent upcoding. For hospitals, in the actual
implementation of prospective payment, the Diagnostic Related Group system is used: after
the treatment episode, the provider reports the consumers primary diagnosis for payment.
The so-called DRG creep refers to a provider gaming the insurer by misreporting a consumers
diagnosis to get a higher price. For physicians, prospective payment encourages seeking a
higher price by lying about the actual treatment.
The current theoretical and policy debates have been heavily against cost-based pay-
ments. Cost reimbursement has none of the problems of dumping, cream skimming, and
upcoding, simply because under cost reimbursement, consumer cost heterogeneity is of no
concern to the provider. Cost reimbursement avoids a host of selection issues. The current
sentiment is that cost reimbursement is a bad policy because of cost ine¢ciency. In this
paper, we show how cost e¢ciency can be made consistent with cost reimbursement.
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The incentive mechanism for the provider to exert cost e¤ort under cost reimbursement
works as follows. We assume that quality is not observed by consumers, but an insurer can
observe both quality and cost e¤orts. Our innovation is to let the insurer construct a value
indexa weighted average of the quality and cost e¤ortsand disclose this to consumers.
Still, why would the provider exert cost e¤ort under cost reimbursement? Consumers
only observe the value index, not quality, so they will infer about quality based on the value
index. A given level of value index therefore corresponds to some inferred quality level,
generates a demand, and, hence, prots. However, the insurer mixes quality and cost e¤ort
to construct the value index. The provider could invest in quality alone to achieve any value
index, but it would get a higher prot by investing in cost e¤ort also.
For example, suppose that the value index puts equal weight on quality and cost e¤ort.
To achieve a value index of 100 by quality alone, quality would have to be 200 (which yields
100 = 200*0.5 + 0*0.5). However, the provider could achieve that index by choosing both
quality and cost e¤ort at 100. Quality and cost e¤ort generate disutilities, so among the
many combinations of quality and cost e¤ort that can generate a value index, the provider
will choose the prot-maximizing one. Generally, the prot-maximizing cost e¤ort is strictly
positive. Furthermore, the insurer can choose the index weight and prot margin to make
the provider internalize the net social benet of cost e¤ort and quality.
It has not escaped our notice that our theory relies on the provider being unable to
disclose credibly quality information. If a provider was able to do so, it could defeat the
value-index manipulation. In practice, there does not seem to be any danger that any
provider could fully disclose quality information. Otherwise, public agencies (such as the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) and nonprot organizations (such as Consumer
Reports and the National Committee for Quality Assurance) would not have expended huge
resources on quality reports to the general public. Furthermore, it is far from clear that a
provider would report honestly quality information even when it was feasible to do so.
The literature on provider payment design is large. For extensive surveys of theoretical
and empirical ndings, see Newhouse (1996), McGuire (2000), and Leger (2008). Ma (1994)
laid out the basic model of health care payment systems and their e¤ects on quality and cost
incentives. The general consensus is that cost reimbursement fails to achieve cost e¢ciency,
and that prospective payment leads to perverse selection incentives such as dumping and
creaming. Generally neither cost reimbursement nor prospective payment achieves socially
e¢cient outcomes.
In recent years, many insurers have introduced reforms to complement cost reimburse-
ment and prospective payment (McClellan, 2011). These payment schemes tend to be a mix
of prospective payment and cost reimbursement, as well as new elements such as pay for
performance, and ex post risk-adjusted payments. This paper keeps prospective payment
and cost reimbursement at their simplest forms, and focuses on how an insurer can use qual-
ity and cost-e¤ort information disclosure to incentivize providers. This in turn allows us to
o¤er a mechanism of information disclosure and cost reimbursement to resolve the trade-o¤
between cost e¢ciency and selections.
We assume a demand response: consumers demand for services reacts positively to
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quality. This is an assumption that is almost universally adopted in the literature: see for
example, Rogerson (1994), Ma and McGuire (1997), Frank et al. (2000), Glazer and McGuire
(2000), Brekke et al. (2006). One exception in the payment design literature is Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998); they posit that even when quality increases, more demand cannot
be satised due to limited capacities and rationing, common in many European systems.
Chalkley and Malcomson then assume that the provider is altruistic. Altruism motivates
quality e¤orts. We use a conventional assumption that the provider seeks to maximize
prots.
A number of recent papers empirically evaluate demand response to public reports. In
commercial health-plan markets, both Beaulieu (2002) and Scanlon et al. (2002) show that
consumers do avoid health plans with low ratings. Since 1999, the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services has launched quality-report initiatives for health plans, hospitals,
physicians, and nursing homes (see www.cms.gov/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/). Dafny and
Dranove (2008) nd that the reports for Medicare health plans substantially a¤ected enroll-
ments.
Our paper is closely related to a small but growing literature on optimal public-report
design. Glazer and McGuire (2006) propose that a regulator can solve an adverse-selection
problem in a competitive market by reporting only average-quality information. Their con-
cern is quality for ex ante heterogenous consumers, and their mechanism achieves cross
subsidies among consumers and rst-best qualities by average-quality reports. Ma and Mak
(2011) characterize the optimal average-quality reports that mitigate monopoly price dis-
crimination and quality distortion. The current paper contributes to the literature by simul-
taneously studying optimal payment and reporting policies. In particular, we show that an
optimal reporting policy can induce socially e¢cient cost e¤ort under cost reimbursement.
Information asymmetry has long been viewed as a source of ine¢ciency in the physician-
patient interaction literature. For example, in both Dranove (1988) and Rochaix (1989), a
physician utilizes his private information to induce patient demand for excessive treatments.
Instead, the insurer in our model holds back some information from consumers to induce
cost-reduction e¤ort. Our main result shows that information asymmetry improves e¢ciency
in physician-patient interaction under cost reimbursement.
Information disclosure has been extensively studied in the industrial organization liter-
ature. In Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Schlee (1996), product quality is unknown
to the seller, consumers, or both. They show that quality information can harm consumers
because of the sellers price response. We instead focus on how a trusted intermediary can
utilize demand response to discipline a seller. In both Lizzeri (1999) and Albano and Lizzeri
(2001), a prot-maximizing intermediary privately observes product quality. They show that
the intermediary may underprovide quality information at the expense of market e¢ciency.
But the insurer in our model withholds information to achieve e¢cient quality and cost
e¤ort.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 sets up
the information structure, and derives our main result. Section 4 considers four robustness
issues. We rst show the implemention of the rst best i) when consumers may misinterpret
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the value index, ii) when cost information, rather than e¤ort, is observed, and iii) when
the provider chooses many qualities. Then we show that cost reimbursement outperforms
prospective payment when a provider can practice dumping and cream-skimming. Finally,
Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers and a provider
A set of consumers are covered by an insurer. We let the insurance coverage be complete,
so consumers have no copayments. Health services are to be supplied by a provider. If
consumers believe that health care quality is q, the quantity demanded is D(q). The function
D is strictly increasing and concave. The social benet from quality q is denoted by B(q)
where B is a strictly increasing and concave function. In many applications B is consumer
benet from services, but we allow a more general interpretation so that externalities, equity,
and any other such issues can be included.
A provider supplies health services to the insured consumers. It chooses the quality of
care q and a cost-reduction e¤ort e, both nonnegative. The unit cost for service is C(q; e)
when the provider chooses quality q and e¤ort e. The function C is strictly increasing in q
and strictly decreasing in e, and convex. A higher quality of care requires a higher cost, but
cost can be reduced by the providers e¤ort.2 In addition, the provider incurs two xed costs
or disutilities for quality and e¤ort, namely G(q) and H(e). The two functions G and H are
strictly increasing and convex. With quality q and e¤ort e, the demand will be D(q), so the
provider incurs a total cost D(q)C(q; e) +G(q) +H(e).
2.2 Payment mechanisms and information
Quality and cost-reduction e¤ort are noncontractible. The quantity of services is observed
ex post and payment can be based on it. The unit cost of services C(q; e) is also ex post
observed, and again payment can be based on it. The xed cost of quality and the disutility
of cost e¤ort are unobservable. These are standard assumptions reecting the complexity of
quality and e¤ort, as well as common payment policies.
In the literature, two forms of payment have been extensively studied: prospective pay-
ment and cost reimbursement. Prospective payment is a xed price p per unit of delivered
service. Under cost reimbursement, the provider will be paid the variable cost C(q; e) plus a
margin m per unit of delivered services. Prospective payment p and the margin m are non-
negative. We will study these two forms of payment. We also include a lump-sum payment,
2The model can be easily extended to incoporate cost heterogenity. Dumping and cream skim-
ming for the current model have been addressed by Ma (1994). More discussions are in Subsection
4.4.
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a transfer, for the provider. This transfer can be positive or negative.
Our departure from the classical payment-design problem is on the information about
quality and cost e¤ort. In the literature, consumers are assumed to observe the quality q
and their demand for services is straightforwardly given by the demand function D(q). We
consider an alternative scenario. Here, consumers are unable to observe quality and cost
e¤ort directly. This actually is consistent with the maintained assumption that quality and
e¤ort are complex and noncontractible, and arguably more realistic.
The insurer acts as a trusted information intermediary. The insurer observes the providers
choice of quality and e¤ort. The insurer then decides whether to disclose this information.
The insurer may disclose information fully. The insurer may also choose to disclose an in-
dex. If quality q and e¤ort e have been chosen, the insurer may construct a weighted average
I() = q + (1   )e, where 0    1. This index is then reported to consumers. We will
call I() a value index.
Consumers are interested in quality. Their demand for health services does not depend
on cost e¤ort. If we set the weight of the value index  to 1, then full quality information
will be revealed to consumers. If  is always set to 1, consumers observe the providers
quality choice and respond by demanding health care; this would be the standard model.
The point of our paper, however, is that the weight should be set di¤erent from 1 under cost
reimbursement.
2.3 The rst best
In the rst best, quality and cost e¤ort are contractible. The social welfare from quality q
and e¤ort e is
B(q) D(q)C(q; e) G(q) H(e); (1)
which is simply the social benet less the total cost. Let q and e be the quality and e¤ort
that maximize social welfare in (1). They are characterized by the rst-order conditions:
B0(q) D0(q)C(q; e) D(q)Cq(q
; e) G0(q) = 0 (2)
 D(q)Ce(q
; e) H 0(e) = 0; (3)
where we use the usual notation to denote derivatives and partial derivatives. The rst-order
conditions have the usual marginal interpretations. Raising quality increases social benet,
but it also raises demand (hence total cost), unit cost, and xed cost. Raising cost e¤ort
reduces unit cost but raises xed cost. The rst-order conditions in (2) and (3) balance these
marginal e¤ects.
6
3 Prospective payment, cost reimbursement, and value
index
3.1 Prospective payment and rst best
We let the insurer either operate in a competitive market, or be a public agency. The
insurers objective is to maximize a weighted sum of social net benet and the providers
prot, with a lower weight on prot. In a prospective payment system, the provider is paid
a xed price p per unit of service, together with a transfer T . Suppose that the insurer fully
discloses quality q ( = 1). When the provider chooses quality q and e¤ort e, its payo¤ is
T + pD(q) D(q)C(q; e) G(q) H(e): (4)
The quality and cost e¤ort generate a social net benet
B(q)  pD(q)  T; (5)
which is the social benet B(q) less payments to the provider.
The insurers objective is to choose the prospective price p and the transfer T to maximize
w[B(q)  pD(q)  T ] + (1  w)[T + pD(q) D(q)C(q; e) G(q) H(e)]; (6)
where :5 < w  1. The provider must make a nonnegative prot, so the expression in (4)
must be nonnegative. Given that the welfare weight is larger on social net benet, the optimal
transfer T  will make sure that prot in (4) is exactly zero. The insurers objective is then
simplied into a choice of price p to maximize (5). A choice of p implements the providers
best response of choosing q and e to maximize its prot (4). The following proposition is
adapted from Ma (1994), and stated with its proof omitted:
Proposition 1 : By choosing p =
B0(q)
D0(q)
and a suitable transfer T , the insurer imple-
ments the rst-best quality q and cost e¤ort e.
The intuition is well documented in the literature. Under prospective payment, the
provider fully internalizes the social cost of quality and cost-reduction e¤ort. Its incentive
on cost e¢ciency aligns with the insurers. By setting the prospective price at the p in
Proposition 1, the insurer makes the provider internalize the social benet of quality as well.
Any prot from the prospective payment is taxed away by the transfer, so the rst best is
implemented.
3.2 Cost reimbursement, value index, and rst best
Under cost reimbursement, the insurer commits to reimburse the providers variable cost,
and pays a margin m for each unit of delivered services. Furthermore, the insurer will report
on the providers choices of quality and cost e¤ort in the form of a value index. We study
the perfect-Bayesian equilibria of the following extensive-form game:
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Stage 1: The insurer sets the transfer T , the margin m, and the weight  in the value
index. The insurer also commits to reimbursing the providers operating cost.
Stage 2: The provider chooses quality q and e¤ort e.
Stage 3: The insurer observes the providers choices of quality q and e¤ort e, and reports
the value index I() = q + (1  )e to consumers.
Stage 4: Consumers learn I() (but never the providers choices of q and e), and decide
on the quantity of services to obtain.
Consumers do not observe the providers quality choice, and must infer it from the value
index, so we consider perfect-Bayesian equilibria. What are consumers equilibrium beliefs?
Suppose that in an equilibrium, the provider chooses quality bq and be, and therefore the value
index is I() = bq + (1  )be. Then in equilibrium, consumers must believe quality to be bq,
and their demand will be D(bq). Given this belief, the providers prot from choosing any
quality q and e¤ort e satisfying q + (1  )e = bq + (1  )be is
T +mD(bq) G(q) H(e): (7)
Any change of (q; e) from (bq; be) cannot be detected by consumers as long as they generate
the same value index q+(1  )e = bq+(1  )be, so equilibrium quality bq and e¤ort be must
maximize prot.
Lemma 1 : Equilibrium quality and cost e¤ort (bq; be) must solve
max
q;e
T +mD(bq) G(q) H(e)
subject to q + (1  )e = bq + (1  )be:
Hence (bq; be) satisfy
G0(bq)
H 0(be)
=

1  
: (8)
Lemma 1 says that equilibrium quality and cost e¤ort must minimize their combined
xed cost G and H to achieve any level of the value index.3 The condition in (8) gives the
optimality condition for the minimization of G(q) +H(e) subject to q + (1  )e being set
at some xed level. The ratio of the marginal disutilities G0(q)=H 0(e) must be equal to the
ratio of the quality and cost weights =(1  ).
3The more theoretically inclined reader must notice that Lemma 1 also species consumer beliefs
o¤ the equilibrium path. The Lemma says that for any quality index, not just the one chosen by
the provider in equilibrium, consumers believe that quality and cost e¤ort have been chosen to
minimize the disutility. This can be justied by a weak belief restriction. The providers strategy
of choosing quality and cost that do not minimize disutility for some value index is dominated by
one that does. Therefore, Lemma 1 essentially says that consumers never believe that the provider
chooses a weakly dominated strategy.
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Figure 1: Cost minimizing quality and e¤ort
Even when unit variable costs, C(q; e), are completely reimbursed, the provider still
has an incentive to put in cost-reduction e¤orts. The key is that consumers respond to
quality, but they only observe the value index, so they infer quality from the value index. If
the insurer makes both quality and cost e¤ort contribute to the quality index by setting 
between 0 and 1, incentives for cost e¤ort are feasible.
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 1. The downward sloping straight line is an iso-index line. It
plots the combination of quality and cost e¤ort that give rise to a certain value of the index,
say I1(). The iso-disutility line, which is concave to the origin, describes those (q; e) pairs
that yield a constant disutility G(q) + H(e). The tangency point (bq1(); be1()) minimizes
disutility subject to the value index constraint.
The provider can choose various combinations of quality and e¤ort to achieve di¤erent
levels of the value index. As the level of the value index changes, di¤erent tangency points
result: the expansion path is the upward-sloping dotted line. A change in the value of the
weight  will tilt the expansion path. For example, if  increases so that quality has a higher
weight in the index, the provider will choose more quality and less e¤ort. This corresponds
to the iso-index line being pivoted in a clockwise direction.
Given a margin m and a value-index weight, the providers equilibrium quality q and e
are those that maximize T + mD(q)   G(q)   H(e) subject to (8). We assume that this
constrained optimization problem is well-behaved, so the rst-order conditions are necessary
and su¢cient.4 The following proposition says that cost reimbursement with value-index
4Use the constraint (8) to dene implicitly e as a function of q. Then substitute e in the prot
function, which now has a single variable q. This is equation (18) in the proof of Proposition 2.
The providers rst-order condition is su¢cient if (18) is quasi-concave in q. It is straightforward
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Figure 2: Implementing the rst-best quality and e¤ort
reporting achieves the rst best.
Proposition 2 : By choosing  =
G0(q)
G0(q) +H 0(e)
, m =
G0(q)
D0(q)
+
H 0(e)
D0(q)

d lnG0(q)
d lnH 0(e)
,
and a suitable transfer T , the insurer implements the rst-best quality q and cost e¤ort e.
By Lemma 1, the insurer can choose a weight so that the rst-best quality and cost
e¤ort minimize disutility G(q) + H(q). This is the weight  obtained by solving for  in
(8) at bq = q and be = e. In other words, the weight  ensures that the rst best is on the
expansion path, so it is a candidate for an equilibrium; see Figure 2.
Next, the margin m is to be chosen so that the rst best is indeed the providers equi-
librium choice. Respecting the constraint (8) in Lemma 1, the provider chooses between
q and e according to the usual trade-o¤. Consider the iso-prot line obtained by setting
T + mD(q)   G(q)   H(e) to a constant. This implicitly denes a function e in terms of
q. The derivative of the iso-prot line is [mD0(q)   G0(q)]=H 0(e), which is positive for low
qs but turns negative at high qs, so this function has an inverted U-shape, like the one in
Figure 2. Points below the iso-prot line yield higher prots to the provider. And a higher
value of m shifts this function upward in the q-e space. The equilibrium is the tangency
point (q; e).
We now interpret the optimal margin m. First, the constraint (8) implicitly denes
the expansion path in Figure 2 as a function e in terms of q. The slope of this function is
to nd conditions in terms of derivatives of the various functions to guarantee that (18) is concave.
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given by dlnG0(q)=dlnH 0(e) (see the Appendix), which describes the proportional change
of G0 with respect to the proportional change in H 0. Next, equating dlnG0(q)=dlnH 0(e) to
the slope of the iso-prot line [mD0(q)  G0(q)]=H 0(e) at (q; e) and rearranging terms, we
obtain the m in the Proposition. In equilibrium, the m is set such that the providers
marginal benet of quality investment mD0(q) equates the sum of marginal disutilities
G0(q) +H 0(e) [dlnG0(q)=dlnH 0(e)].
It is important that consumers rely on the value index to infer about quality. If a
provider could credibly reveal its quality, it could avoid the constraint on the equilibrium
mix of quality and cost e¤ort due to the value index (Lemma 1). Cost-e¤ort information per
se is not valuable to consumers. If the provider does not need to exert cost e¤ort to convey
quality information to consumers, the perverse cost e¤ort property of cost reimbursement
remains. The policy implication is perhaps quite obvious: public agencies should have a keen
interest in information disclosure. A more radical policy would require public certication
or regulation of any information disclosure.
A combination of value-index weight and the margin over cost reimbursement implement
the rst best. The literature has discussed extensively the poor cost-e¤ort incentives under
cost reimbursement, as well as the incentives for a provider to dump unprotable consumers
and cream-skim protable ones under prospective payment. Proposition 2 o¤ers a di¤erent
perspective. Cost reimbursement eliminates incentives to dump or to cream-skim patients,
but its perverse cost incentives can be avoided. We next turn to a number of robustness
issues.
4 Robustness of value index, consumer inferences, and
selection
4.1 Consumer rationality
It may appear that Lemma 1 relies on consumers being fully rational. In fact, Lemma 1 stems
from the rm maximizing prots. Consider an arbitrary inference rule (such as consumers
naively believing that quality is always 50% of the value index). If the value index takes a
value of I, assume that consumers believe that the quality is 	(I), where 	 is an increasing
and di¤erentiable function.
Under cost reimbursement, given a margin m and an index I, the providers prot is
D(	(I))m G(q) H(e):
Equilibrium quality bq and e¤ort be must solve
max
q;e
D(	(I))m G(q) H(e)
subject to q + (1   )e = bq + (1   )be = I. Because the index I is xed in the above
11
constrained maximization program, the rst-order conditions with respect to q and e are:
 G0(q) +  = 0
 H 0(e0) + (1  ) = 0
where  is the multiplier. From these rst-order conditions, we obtain
G0(q)
H 0(e)
=

1  
;
which is (8) in Lemma 1.
As long as the provider minimizes the disutilities due to quality and cost e¤ort, the value-
index weight determines how the provider must trade-o¤ quality against cost e¤ort, given
any consumer inference. The value index therefore incentivizes the provider to reduce cost.
To ensure that the rst best is an equilibrium, the insurer must set  at  =
G0(q)
G0(q) +H 0(e)
,
as in Proposition 2. The implementation of the rst best, however, must use a margin dif-
ferent from the one in Proposition 2. Under the inference rule 	, prot is
D(	(q + (1  )e(q)))m G(q) H(e(q)); (9)
where the function e(q) is implicitly dened by (8) (see also the proof of Proposition 2). The
monotonicity of 	 implies that there exists an m such that the rst-order derivative of (9)
vanishes at q = q. This value of m implements the rst best, but generally this will be
di¤erent from the one in Proposition 2.
4.2 Cost and value index
In this subsection, we change the value index into a weighted average of quality and unit
cost. Using cost information may be more practical because cost may be easier to observe
than e¤ort. Now let the value index be dened by J() = q+(1 )(K C(q; e)), for some
cost ceiling K > 0, and su¢ciently big. Here, K  C(q; e) measures the cost reduction from
the preset ceiling.
Under cost reimbursement equilibrium quality and e¤ort are those that minimize the
xed cost or disutility given any level of the value index. Hence equilibrium bq and be solve
min
q;e
G(q) +H(e)
subject to q + (1  )(K  C(q; e)) = bq + (1  )(K  C(bq; be)). The rst-order conditions
are:
G0(q)   [   (1  )Cq(q; e)] = 0
H 0(e) + (1  )Ce(q; e) = 0;
12
Figure 3: Using cost information to implement the rst best
which simplify to
G0(q)
H 0(e)
=  
   (1  )Cq(q; e)
(1  )Ce(q; e)
: (10)
The equilibrium quality and cost e¤ort choices can be illustrated in Figure 3. Because C
is assumed convex, the upper contour sets of the iso-index line q+(1 )(K C(q; e)) = J()
are convex. In Figure 3, the iso-index lines, at index values J1() and J2(), are the circular
lines. The iso-disutility line is the one that is concave to the origin. An equilibrium is the
tangency point between the iso-index and iso-disutility lines. Changing the index weight 
corresponds to changing the entire map of the iso-index lines. Nevertheless, for any , (10)
denes a monotone, increasing function of e in q, say e(q).
To implement the rst best, rst set  to  where
G0(q)
H 0(e)
=  
   (1  )Cq(q
; e)
(1  )Ce(q; e)
: (11)
This guarantees that the rst best is a potential equilibrium. Because (10) is linear in , at
(q; e) = (q; e), there is a unique  that satises (11). Next, given  = , the providers
prot is
mD(q) G(q) H(e(q));
whose rst-order derivative is mD0(q)  G0(q) H 0(e(q))e0(q). We choose m such that it is
optimal for the provider to choose the rst best:
mD0(q) G0(q) H 0(e(q))e0(q) = 0:
13
Again, the margin that implements the rst best will be di¤erent from the one in Proposition
2, but it achieves the same outcome.
4.3 Multiple qualities
Suppose now there are two service qualities, q1 and q2. We extend the denitions of demand,
social benet, cost, and disutilities in the obvious way: D(q1; q2), B(q1; q2), C(q1; q2; e),
G1(q1), G2(q2), and H(e). We also maintain the corresponding concavity and convexity
assumptions.
The social welfare is now
B(q1; q2) D(q1; q2)C(q1; q2; e) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e): (12)
Let q
1
, q
2
, and e be the rst-best qualities and e¤ort.5 Under prospective payment with
transfer T and price p, and complete quality-information disclosure, the providers prot is
T + pD(q1; q2) D(q1; q2)C(q1; q2; e) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e):
If the insurer discloses information of both q1 and q2, a prospective price can be chosen to
implement the rst best if and only if
Bq1(q

1
; q
2
)
Dq1(q

1
; q
2
)
=
Bq2(q

1
; q
2
)
Dq2(q

1
; q
2
)
(13)
(which is also the prospective price). This result is obtained by comparing the rst-order
conditions for the rst best and for the providers prot maximization (as in Proposition 1).
With a single quality, a single prospective price is su¢cient for the rst best, as in Propo-
sition 1. With multiple qualities, a single prospective price is insu¢cient generally. The
provider internalizes cost under prospective payment, but prot maximization is achieved
only if the (net) marginal contributions of qualities to prots are equalized. This prot-
maximizing marginal contribution is generally di¤erent from each qualitys marginal con-
tribution to social benet. Condition (13) simply imposes the equality of these marginal
contributions. To see this, rearrange (13) to
Bq1(q

1
; q
2
)
Bq2(q

1
; q
2
)
=
Dq1(q

1
; q
2
)
Dq2(q

1
; q
2
)
; (14)
5They are characterized by the rst-order conditions:
Bq1(q

1
; q
2
) Dq1(q

1
; q
2
)C(q
1
; q
2
; e) D(q
1
; q
2
)Cq1(q

1
; q
2
; e) G0
1
(q
1
) = 0
Bq2(q

1
; q
2
) Dq2(q

1
; q
2
)C(q
1
; q
2
; e) D(q
1
; q
2
)Cq2(q

1
; q
2
; e) G0
2
(q
2
) = 0
 D(q
1
; q
2
)Ce(q

1
; q
2
; e) H 0(e) = 0;
which have the usual interpretations.
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which says that the marginal rates of substitution between the two qualities have to be
identical in the social benet function and in the marginal revenue function.
The insurer can still implement the rst best if it discloses a quality index, rather than
full information about the qualities. Suppose that the providers qualities are q1 and q2.
Construct the quality index q1 + (1   )q2  K(), where 0    1. The insurer
announces this quality index. When consumers observe K(), they draw inferences about
the unobservable qualities q1 and q2.
Analogous to Lemma 1, the equilibrium inference must be qualities bq1 and bq2 which solve
max
q1;q2
T + pD(bq1; bq2) D(bq1; bq2)C(q1; q2; e) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e)
subject to q1 + (1  )q2 = bq1 + (1  )bq2: (15)
Any choice of qualities that achieve the quality index will yield the same inference. The
provider optimally chooses those qualities that maximize prot, given the quality index. A
suitable choice of the index weight  therefore can implement the rst-best marginal rate of
substitution between the two qualities, as in (14).
The insurer next chooses a prospective price. Given that the provider internalizes the
cost, a quality index and a prospective payment are su¢cient to implement the rst best.
Cost reimbursement with value index can perform exactly the same. Here, the insurer
constructs a value index: I(1; 2) = 1q1 + 2q2 + (1  1   2)e, where the weights, 1 and
2, are positive and sum to less than 1. Under cost reimbursement, equilibrium qualities and
cost e¤ort must minimize the disutility. Any equilibrium bq1, bq2, and be solve
max
q1;q2;e
T +mD(bq1; bq2) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e)
subject to 1q1 + 2q2 + (1  1   2)e = 1bq1 + 2bq2 + (1  1   2)be: (16)
Using the value-index weights, the insurer controls how the provider trades o¤ between each
quality and the cost e¤ort, analogous to Lemma 1. Finally, using the margin the insurer
implements the rst best, as in Proposition 2.
4.4 Dumping and cream-skimming
The equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement no longer holds when cost
is uncertain. We can extend the model for cost heterogeneity. In this case, the provider
may dump high-cost consumers, and cream-skim low-cost consumers. We rst address the
problem of dumping. Let the unit cost of treating a consumer be randomly distributed on
[C;C]. We use F to denote the cumulative distribution, which is a function of both quality
and e¤ort. Therefore, F (C; q; e) is the proportion of consumers who can be treated at unit
cost below C when quality and e¤ort are, respectively, q and e. We let F (C; q; e) be strictly
positive on [C;C]. Under prospective payment, the provider chooses the rst-best quality
and e¤ort, and accepts all consumers only if C  p. Otherwise, when p < C the provider
will dump all those consumers with cost above p. The rst best is not implementable.
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Alternatively, the provider can raise prot by cream-skimming low-cost consumers under
prospective payment. For simplicity, suppose there are two types of consumers, A and B.
For xed quality and e¤ort, the cost of a type-B consumer is  times higher than the cost
of a type-A consumer, where  > 1. Here, cream-skimming refers to the use of di¤erent
quality levels to discriminate against consumers with di¤erent costs. Let qA and qB be the
respective quality levels the provider chooses for the type-A and the type-B consumers. The
provider will cream-skim the type-A consumers by setting qB < qA. Again, the rst best
is not implementable. Full analysis of dumping and cream-skimming can be found in Ma
(1994).
Here, we emphasize that cost reimbursement has none of the problems of dumping and
cream-skimming. Under cost reimbursement, the actual treatment cost of a consumer is fully
reimbursed. Dumping and cream-skimming are unprotable. By choosing suitable margin
m and weight , the insurer continues to implement the optimal quality and cost e¤ort, as
in Proposition 2.
5 Conclusion
Prospective payment and cost reimbursement are common payment mechanisms for health
care services. In the past thirty years, many theoretical and empirical studies have pointed
out the di¤erent quality and cost incentives of the two payment systems. In this paper, we
have shown how, by optimally choosing the content of public report, an insurer can make
the two payment systems implement identical quality and cost incentives. Our results are
robust to report misinterpretation, unobservable cost e¤ort, and multiple qualities. Because
prospective payment is known to create dumping, cream-skimming, and up-coding incentives,
our result is particularly relevant when patient selection problems are serious.
The main point here can be interpreted as using information as an incentive strategy.
Given that health service quality is di¢cult for consumers to know about, it is incumbent
upon insurers and regulators to inform consumers. The usual approach is a sort of empow-
ering of consumers with as much information as common consumer cognition allows. Here,
we question this approach. Information disclosure a¤ects a providers incentive to invest in
quality and cost e¤ort, and should be considered along with payment mechanisms.
Our analysis is based on a linear value index. Linearity is a restriction, but linear functions
are analytically tractable. Linear value or quality indexes are likely better understood by
consumers than more complicated schemes. Given that we can implement the rst best with
a linear index, it is not surprising that nonlinear ones may also succeed. A candidate is a
kind of forcing index. The insurer fully discloses quality if and only if cost e¤ort is no
less than the rst-best level; otherwise, the insurer discloses nothing. In e¤ect, the insurer
threatens to shut down the market if the provider refuses to choose the rst-best cost e¤ort.
The forcing index lacks credibility and robustness. First, it seems incredible that an in-
surer can commit to such a drastic measure as e¤ectively shutting down the market. Second,
the discontinuity in the forcing index is unattractive. If a provider chooses a cost e¤ort
slightly lower than the rst best, the outcome becomes untenable. Our linear index, how-
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ever, is robust. A small error in model specication will only lead to a small deviation in
the equilibrium.
We have assumed that the insurer can make a lump-sum transfer to the provider. This is
consistent with the vast majority of the literature on provider payment design. Two recent
papers study optimal provider payment systems when lump-sum transfer is not allowed.
Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) show that the rst-best quality and cost e¤ort are not at-
tainable without transfer. They then characterize the constrained-optimal prospective price
and margin. Miraldo et al. (2011) further characterize the constrained-optimal prospective
price list when providers have di¤erent cost types. In our model, the rst best may not be
achieved when transfer is not allowed; a single prospective price or margin cannot handle
both distribution and incentive problems. Yet, value-index reporting will continue to induce
cost-reduction e¤ort under cost reimbursement.
As the health care market evolves, payment systems have tended to become complicated.
Pay for performance is now discussed often in policy and theoretical research; see, for ex-
ample, works by Eggleston (2005), Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011), and Richardson (2011).
The idea in this paper calls for a more fundamental approach. Any reward system must be
based on available information. A central issue, as we have shown here, is how the insurer
may strategically disclose information. Furthermore, information and nancial instruments
should be chosen simultaneously to align incentives.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that equilibrium quality bq and e¤ort be achieve the value index
I() = bq + (1   )be. Consumers must believe, in equilibrium, that the providers quality
is bq, so the demand is D(bq). Next, suppose that the provider deviates to any other pair of
quality and e¤ort such that the same value index is achieved. That is, suppose the provider
deviates to any q and e where bq+(1 )be = q+(1 )e, then consumers must continue to
believe that the quality is bq. The providers prot is T +mD(bq) G(q) H(e). By denition
of an equilibrium, T +mD(bq) G(q) H(e)  T +mD(bq) G(bq) H(be). Because G and
H are strictly convex, the inequality is strict if and only if (q; e) 6= (bq; be). Maximizing (7)
subject to I() = q + (1  )e, we obtain the rst-order condition (8).
Proof of Proposition 2: First, by Lemma 1, to ensure that the rst-best quality q and
e¤ort e can be an equilibrium choice by the provider, the value of the weight must satisfy
G0(q)
H 0(e)
=

1  
:
Solving this equation for  yields the value for  in the Proposition. For the rest of the
proof,  is set at this value.
Second, again from Lemma 1, for any  we use (8) to dene implicitly e as a function
of q. (This function also depends on , but now that  is xed at  we omit  from the
argument of function.) This yields e = e(q), with
e0(q) =
1  

G00(q)
H 00(e)
> 0: (17)
For any givenm, the providers objective can now be regarded as a choice of q that maximizes
T +mD(q) G(q) H(e (q)): (18)
The rst-order condition is
mD0(q) = G0(q) +H 0(e) e0(q): (19)
The right-hand side of (19) is strictly positive for any q. Because D0 is positive, there must
exist m > 0 to satisfy (19) at any q. The value of m in the Proposition is the solution for
m in (19) at q = q and  = . The expression for m in the Proposition is obtained after
simplication by using (17) and the identity dln f(x)  f 0(x)=f(x).
Finally, the value of the transfer T is chosen that T +mD(q) G(q) H(e) = 0. 
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Supplement: multiple qualities and equilibria
In this supplementary note, we illustrate how to implement the rst best with multiple
qualities.
Prospective payment
From the maximization program (15), we obtain the rst-order condition
D(q
1
; q
2
)Cq1(q1; q2; e) +G
0
1
(q1)
D(q
1
; q
2
)Cq2(q1; q2; e) +G
0
2
(q2)
=

1  
:
Setting the qualities and e¤ort to (q
1
; q
2
; e) and rearrange terms, we get the equilibrium
weight
 =
D(q
1
; q
2
)Cq1(q

1
; q
2
; e) +G0
1
(q
1
)
D(q
1
; q
2
)[Cq1(q

1
; q
2
; e) + Cq2(q

1
; q
2
; e)] +G0
1
(q
1
) +G0
2
(q
2
)
:
Given , the providers constrained-maximization problem is
max
q1;q2
T + pD(q1; q2) D(q1; q2)C(q1; q2; e) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e)
+f[D(q1; q2)Cq2(q1; q2; e) +G
0
2
(q2)]  (1  
)[D(q1; q2)Cq1(q1; q2; e) +G
0
1
(q1)]g:
The equilibrium p that implements the rst best can be obtained straightforwardly by
solving the rst-order conditions of the maximization problem. The transfer T is chosen
such that T + pD(q
1
; q
2
) D(q
1
; q
2
)C(q
1
; q
2
; e) G1(q

1
) G2(q

2
) H(e) = 0.
Cost reimbursement
From the maximization program (16), we obtain the rst-order conditions
G0
1
(q1)
1
=
G0
2
(q2)
2
=
H 0(e)
1  1   2
:
Setting the qualities and e¤ort to (q
1
; q
2
; e), the rst-order conditions give the equilibrium
weights

1
=
G0
1
(q
1
)
G0
1
(q
1
) +G0
2
(q
2
) +H 0(e)
;

2
=
G0
2
(q
2
)
G0
1
(q
1
) +G0
2
(q
2
) +H 0(e)
:
Given 
1
and 
2
, the providers constrained-maximization problem is
max
q1;q2
T +mD(q1; q2) G1(q1) G2(q2) H(e)
+
1
[
2
G0
1
(q1)  

1
G0
2
(q2)]
+
2
[(1  
1
  
2
)G0
2
(q2)  

2
H 0(e)]:
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Again, the equilibrium m can be obtained by solving the rst-order conditions of the max-
imization problem. The transfer T is chosen such that T +mD(q
1
; q
2
) G1(q

1
) G2(q

2
) 
H(e) = 0.
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